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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
DISCUSSION AND CRITICISM OF SOME RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
Statistics clearly indicate that in recent years Illinois school boards' have
been increasingly active in the collective bargaining field.' While pressure
from teacher organizations has undoubtedly been responsible for a great deal
of the increased activity, it is likely that the boards have simply come to
recognize the many advantages of collective bargaining. In addition to being
the most effective means of matching employer requirements with employee
needs, collective bargaining is also recognized as the best available way of
assuring resolution of labor-management disputes by peaceful means, to the
advantage of both labor and management, and, in the case of public
employment, to the advantage of the public.' Despite the positive attributes of
collective bargaining and the increasing willingness of school boards to engage
in it, however, there still is no statutory authority in Illinois allowing a public
school board to bargain on a collective basis with its teachers.
The absence of statutory authority for collective bargaining raises serious
questions concerning the legal enforceability of a collective bargaining
agreement entered into by a school board. Specifically, a problem arises with
respect to the permissible scope of such an agreement. In the past ten years
Illinois courts have dealt extensively with these problems. The decisions,
however, have often been vague and inconsistent, making it extremely difficult
for negotiators to ascertain what they legally may do. The objective of this
note is to suggest firm guidelines for the determination of the permissible
scope of such collective bargaining agreements by analyzing recent court
decisions and offering more concrete approaches where the court opinions are
4
unclear or contradictory.
1. A school board is "the governing body of any district created or operating under
authority of this Act, including board of school directors and board of education." ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 122, § 1-3 (1973).
The school code divides districts into three classes: (I) those with less than 1.000
inhabitants; (2) those with 1,000 to 500,000 inhabitants; (3) those with more than 500,000
inhabitants. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 10-1, 10-10, 34-2 (1973). The express statutory powers
of class (1) and class (2) boards are the same. Most of the cases discussed in this article were
decided on the basis of the provisions for classes (I) and (2). Cross-reference will be made to
the separate provisions for class (3) where appropriate.
2. As of July 1974 the Illinois Education Association had local teacher organizations in
689 school districts and 286 of those locals had some form of collective bargaining agreement
with their respective boards. At that time there were 1,051 school districts in Illinois. By March
1975 the number of locals with collective bargaining agreements had grown to 388. Conversation
with Mr. Joseph Triolo, Chairman, Illinois Education Association Regional Council, Region 5, on
March 24, 1975.
3. Chicago Div. of the Ill. Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 76 II. App. 2d 456. 470, 222
N.E.2d 243, 250 (1966).
4. On the subject of collective bargaining by school boards see generally Kinley.
Contractual Powers of School Boards, 1958 U. ILL. L.F. 412; Schwartz, Collective Bargaining

NOTES AND COMMENTS
BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

The primary obstacle to collective bargaining by public school boards has
been a series of judicial decisions that a school board cannot delegate or limit
by contract the discretionary powers conferred on it by legislation.' In
Chicago Division of the Illinois Education Association v. Board of
Education,6 however, an Illinois Appellate Court held that an agreement of a
school board to bargain with a teachers union was valid and not an unlawful
limitation or delegation of board authority. The court's rationale was that the
simple agreement of a board to discuss matters with a teachers' representative
did not, of itself, restrain the will of the board.'
Although clearly permitting teacher representatives and school boards to
negotiate, the Chicago Division opinion provided no definite indication of
what matters could properly be the subject of a contract resulting from those
negotiations.' Therefore the threshold problem in any collective bargaining
endeavor is the determination of what areas are within the permissible scope
of negotiations. Recent cases which have dealt with this problem fall into two
distinct categories. One group deals with collective bargaining agreements
which have attempted to delegate the decision-making authority of the school
board to a third party, such as an arbitrator. Another group involves collective
bargaining agreements which limit the school board's powers by requiring the
board to exercise its authority in a certain prescribed manner. It is helpful, in
any effort to define the permissible scope of collective bargaining agreements,
to treat these areas separately.
THE DELEGATION CASES

An illustration of the principle that a school board cannot delegate its
discretionary powers to a third party is provided by Board of Education v.
Rockford Education Association.9 The Rockford Board of Education had
entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Rockford Education
by School Boards, 57 ILL. B.J. 548 (1969); Note, Teacher Negotiations in Illinois: Current
Status and ProposedReforms, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 307.
For an interesting discussion of the desirable scope of collective bargaining agreements see
Wellington and Winter, Structuring Collective Bargaining in Public Emplo.vment. 79 YALE L.J.
805, 852-70 (1970).
5. Lindblad v. Bd. of Educ., 221 I1. 261, 77 N.E. 450 (1906); Elder v. Bd. of Educ.. 60
Ill. App. 2d 56, 208 N.E.2d 423 (1965); Stroh v. Casner. 201 Il1. App. 281 (1916).
6. 76 Ill. App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1966).
7. Id. at 472, 222 N.E.2d at 251.
8. The court did require, however, that a collective bargaining agreement provide:
[That] the employee organization shall agree not to strike, not to picket in any manner
which would tend to disrupt the operation of any public school . . . that the benefit of
any and all decisions and conclusions the Board of Education may reach after having
negotiated with the employee organization selected shall apply equally to all teachers
and other educational personnel employed by the Board of Education; and that should
negotiations fail to resolve differences, the decision of the Board of Education shall be
final.
Id. at 461, 222 N.E.2d at 246.
9. 3 Il. App. 3d 1090, 280 N.E.2d 286 (1972).
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Association, a corporation organized to represent Rockford teachers in the
negotiation of collective bargaining agreements. One provision of that agreement allowed for a grievance procedure 0 and provided for submission to
binding arbitration of any grievance that could not be satisfactorily resolved by
the superintendent.
The board circulated among the teachers an announcement of the
creation of an administrative position entitled Director of Personnel and
Recruitment. The announcement included a resume of the duties of the
position and invited applications from the teachers. Howard Getts, employed
by the board as a guidance counselor, applied for the job along with several
other faculty members. The board rejected all of the applications and never
filled the position. Getts then filed a grievance alleging that the board's failure
to appoint him to the position violated the collective bargaining agreement."
After the superintendent stated that he was unable to pass on the grievance,
Getts and the Association demanded arbitration. The board, arguing that the
dispute related to its non-delegable power to select employees, objected to the
use of arbitration. The arbitrator, however, ruled the matter arbitrable. The
board then took the matter to court and was successful in having the
arbitrator's order vacated. Getts and the Association appealed.
The appellate court agreed with the board and quickly disposed of the
case. Citing the rule of Lindblad v. Board of Education2 that a school board
cannot delegate to another party those matters of discretion vested in the
board by statute, the court determined that the issue involved was one that
related to the duty of the board "[t]o appoint all teachers and fix the amount
of their salaries."' 3 In holding the duty was one which could not be delegated,
the court rejected Getts' argument that once the board had defined the duties
and salary of the position there was no more discretion to be exercised. It
noted that the individual qualifications of the applicants still had to be
determined and emphasized that only the board, not an outside party, could
do it. The court then affirmed the judgment of the trial court that the
collective bargaining agreement was "to the extent it relates to arbitration of
matters of selection or promotion of employees void and without force of
4
law."'1
The Rockford rule of non-delegability of matters relating to the appointment of teachers was accepted in Board of Education v. Johnson.5 The
10. The agreement defined a grievance as a "claim by the Association or a staff member
that there has been a violation, misinterpretation or misapplication of any provisions of the
Agreement." Id. at 1092, 280 N.E.2d at 287.
11. The provision in question stated that all positions on the "administrative-supervisory
level" would be filled according to certain procedures and "on the basis of qualifications for the
vacant post .
Id. at 1093, 280 N.E.2d at 287.
I..."
12. 221 Ill. 261, 77 N.E. 450 (1906).
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-1 (1973).
14. 3 III. App. 3d 1090, 1092, 280 N.E.2d 286, 287 (1972).
15. 21 Ill. App. 3d 482, 315 N.E.2d 634 (1974).
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Johnson court, however, went further and attempted to determine what
matters could legitimately be considered proper subjects of binding arbitration
provisions.
The Johnson case involved a grievance by two teachers concerning the
board's requirement that teachers write in the names of students on monthly
attendance cards. The collective bargaining agreement between the board and
the teachers association specified that teachers were not to be assigned duties
principally clerical in nature. The grievance was submitted to the arbitration
process where it was found arbitrable and a decision favorable to the teachers
was rendered. The board argued that it could not be bound by the arbitration
award since it could not submit to arbitration matters of discretion vested in it
6
by the Illinois School Code.'
In its opinion the court recognized the benefits of binding arbitration 7 but
also acknowledged the restrictions of the Lindblad rule that discretionary
powers of school boards are non-delegable. 8 It then held that "arbitration of
certain 'minor' disputes pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement does
not constitute a delegation by the board . . ... " Of course, this holding
necessitated an effort to define what constituted a "minor" as opposed to a
major dispute: "[W]e note that certain matters are specifically reserved to the
board by the Illinois School Code and cannot, until such time as the
legislature acts, be the subject of binding arbitration. Thus we believe that
only those terms in collective bargaining agreements that are not in contravention of the Code are arbitrable." 20
The court concluded by applying its rule to the particular grievance
involved in the case. It stated that in its view the statutory requirement 2' that
teachers keep attendance registers furnished by the school directors did not
require teachers to fill in the names of the students. Thus the matter of
whether teachers or clerks were to fill in the names was "minor" and
arbitrable.
Analysis of the Delegation Cases
The Rockford and Johnson cases provide firm guidelines as to what
matters may be made subject to binding arbitration by a collective bargaining
agreement. If the matter is a minor one then it is arbitrable. The Johnson
16. "Teachers shall keep daily registers showing the name, age and attendance of each
pupil, the day of the week, month and year. . . . Such registers shall be furnished by the school
directors . . . . No teacher shall be paid any part of the school funds unless he has accurately
kept and returned such a register." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-18 (1973)
17. 21 Ill. App. 3d 482, 493, 315 N.E.2d 634, 642 (1974).
18. Id. at 492, 315 N.E.2d at 642.
19. Id. at 491, 315 N.E.2d at 641.
20. Id. at 492, 315 N.E.2d at 642. The court went on to hold that the initial determination
of arbitrability should be left to the respective parties and the arbitrator, subject to the judicial
review provisions of the Illinois Arbitration Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, §§ 101 et. seq. (1973).
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-18 (1973).
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court held that a matter is minor if the school code does not specifically grant
the board the power to deal with the matter or impose a duty on the board
relating to the matter. In other words, if a term in a collective bargaining
agreement relates only to the board's general power "to adopt and enforce all
necessary rules for the management and government of the public schools of
[the] district," 2 rather than to any specific statutory power or duty, 23 then
the term is one that may properly be submitted to binding arbitration. Some of
the powers and duties that are specifically set out in the school code as
belonging to the board and which could not properly be made subject to a
binding arbitration provision of a collective bargaining agreement are: the
appointment of teachers and the fixing of their salaries;14 the determination of
curriculum and selection of textbooks;" the establishment of the length of the
school year;26 the determination of the conditions under which teachers may
be paid;2" the fixing of criteria for the employment of teachers;28 the
determination of when a teacher should be dismissed;2 9 the assignment of
pupils to schools;30 and the suspension and expulsion of pupils.3 Since the
school code does not specifically grant school boards the power to prescribe
the duties of teachers,3 2 under the Johnson rule a collective bargaining
agreement may make any matter relating to the duties of teachers subject to
binding arbitration. The only restriction would be that any agreement would
have to take into account the fact that some teacher duties are expressly
prescribed by statute.3
THE LIMITATION CASES

The principle that a school board may not limit its powers by contract
was recently discussed in Classroom Teachers Association v. Board of
Education.34 The plaintiff, Rita Miller, was a tenured teacher who was
transferred, with no reduction in salary, from her position as a guidance
22. Id. § 10-20.5. Section 34-18 of the school code provides that boards of districts with
over 500,000 inhabitants "shall exercise general supervision and management of the public
education and the public school system of the city .... "
23. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 10-20 through 10-20.24, 10-21 through 10-21.6, 10-22
through 10-22.43, and 10-23 through 10-23.9. The specific powers and duties of boards of
districts with over 500,000 population are listed throughout Article 34 of the school code.
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-20.7 (1973).
25. Id. § 10-20.8.
26. Id. § 10-20.12.
27. Id. § 10-20.15.
28. Id. § 10-21.1.
29. Id. § 10-22.4.
30. Id. § 10-22.5.
31. Id. § 10-22.6.
32. The situation would be different in districts with over 500,000 population since Section
34-16 of the school code gives the board the express power to prescribe the duties of its
employees.
33. For example, it is provided by the school code that teachers shall maintain discipline.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 24-24, 34-84a (1973).
34. 15 I1. App. 3d 224, 304 N.E.2d 516 (1973).
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counselor to that of a social studies teacher. She protested the transfer as
being a violation of the collective bargaining agreement between the board and
the teachers association. That agreement required the board, in the case of
involuntary transfers, to follow a procedure of evaluation, notice, and review.
It also mandated a hearing if requested by the teacher."
The court, holding the transfer obviously in violation of the collective
bargaining agreement, stated the issue as whether the provisions of the
agreement were in violation of the Lindblad rule that a school board cannot
limit the discretionary powers given it by the legislature. Specifically, it was
concerned with whether the agreement was an unlawful limitation of the
board's power to appoint teachers.3 6 In its consideration of the issues, the
court distinguished the facts at hand from those in Board of Education v.
Rockford Education Association." In contrast to Rockford, here there was no
provision for binding arbitration, thus no delegation of the board's decisionmaking authority." After making that distinction, the court stated: "The
provisions do no more than establish certain procedures, consistent with
ordinary concepts of fairness, which procedures the board agreed to follow.
None of the procedures limit the power of the board to exercise its absolute
discretion unfettered by any consideration save fundamental fairness." 3 9
A year later the Classroom rationale was expanded in Davis v.'Board of
Education.'0 The Davis case involved the attempted dismissal of Henry
Davis, a second year probationary teacher. As required by law, 4 the board
had given Davis notice of and reasons for the impending dismissal sixty days
before the end of the school year."2 Despite the fact that all legal requirements
had been fulfilled, Davis brought an action for a writ of mandamus on the
35. The pertinent part of the agreement stated:
[I]nvoluntary change in employment status . . . shall be for just cause and preceded by
1. Faithful execution of the evaluation procedure and honoring all rights included in this
agreement or applicable statutes. 2. Forwarding by registered mail of a written
explanation for the action to the teacher. 3. A complete review of the teacher's files by
the Superintendent or his designee with the teacher. At teacher's request a representative may be present. 4. If requested by the teacher, a hearing before the board. The
teacher shall have the right to present evidence, to call witnesses, be represented. The
board shall have the same rights.
Id. at 225, 304 N.E.2d at 517.
36. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-1 (1973).
37. 3 II1.App. 3d 1090, 280 N.E.2d 286 (1972). See the third section of this article for a
discussion of the Rockford case.
38. Id. at228, 280 N.E.2d at 519.
39. 15 111. App. 3d 224, 228, 304 N.E.2d 516, 519 (1973) (emphasis added).
40. 23 Ill. App. 3d 649, 320 N.E.2d 240 (1974).
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-11 (1973).
42. The reasons given for Davis' dismissal were that he (1) permitted students to remain in
his classroom when they were supposed to attend other classes, (2) occasionally left his classes
unsupervised, (3) failed to provide reasonable support to the administration and staff during a
period of confrontation between the district and the students, thus encouraging student rebellion,
(4) made an obscene gesture to a security officer, (5) was generally uncooperative and would not
accept guidance and suggestions, (6) failed to maintain satisfactory working relationships with
colleagues, and (7) was unwilling to fulfill responsibilities in the total school program. 23 Ill. App.
3d 649, 652, 320 N.E.2d 240, 242 (1974).
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ground that he had been improperly dismissed. At trial Davis contended that
the board, by virtue of the procedure utilized in dismissing him, had violated
numerous provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the board
and the teachers association. 3 Specifically, Davis asserted that he was never
informed what methods of evaluation were being used to assess his performance; that he was not formally evaluated during the first semester of the year;
that no copy of a formal evaluation was ever given to him; that no conference
was ever had between him and the principal; and that no suggestions were
ever made to him to improve the quality of his teaching. The primary
contention of the board was that the agreement was not applicable to Davis'
particular situation. The trial court, agreeing with Davis, found that the
dismissal was improper since the board had not followed the applicable
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
The board appealed, contending that even if it had violated the terms of
the agreement, the dismissal was proper since a school board has no power to
enter into an agreement which in effect contracts away its statutory authority
to dismiss teachers for cause.44 The appellate court concurred with the trial
court's ruling that the agreement was violated and was applicable to Davis and
his situation. It then considered the question of whether the provisions of the
agreement were beyond the contractual powers of the board. It held they were
not and affirmed the judgment for Davis.
The Davis court relied heavily on the reasoning in Classroom:
As in Classroom, the collective bargaining agreement here provides
that the defendant Board retains and reserves all rights, powers,
authority, duties and responsibilities vested in it by statute provided
that such will be exercised in conformity with the provisions of the
contract. Therefore, in accord with Classroom, we conclude that the
provisions contained in Appendix XXX of the collective agreement
herein are not ultra vires of the contractual powers of the defendant
Board,
and that the provisions are binding and enforceable against
45
it.
Davis, like Classroom, also emphasized the distinction from Rockford.4 1 Since
there was no provision for binding arbitration, the court viewed the provisions
43. Appendix XXX,M of the collective bargaining agreement read, in pertinent part, as
follows:
Discharge, demotion, or other involuntary change in the employment status of any
teacher shall be preceded by (1) The faithful execution of the evaluation procedures for
the evaluation of classroom teaching performance and the honoring of all teachers' rights
included in this agreement and applicable statutes. (2) A conference with the teacher by
the appropriate administrator prior to taking any action. (3) A written explanation for
the action to the teacher. (4) A complete review of the teacher's personnel file with the
teacher, and (5) There shall be a hearing before the Board if requested by any nontenure teacher whose -contract is not renewed . ...
23 111. App. 3d 649, 655, 320 N.E.2d 240, 245 (1974).
44. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.4 (1973).
45. 23 Ill. App. 3d 649, 659, 320 N.E.2d 240, 247 (1974) (emphasis added)._
46. 3 111. App. 3d 1090, 280 N.E.2d 286 (1972). See discussion of the Rockford case in
the third section of this article.
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of the agreement as simply conditions precedent to the exercise of the board's
discretionary power rather than as a limitation on that power. 4
Analysis of the Limitation Cases
Davis and Classroom can each be criticized because of the reasoning
they employed to reach their conclusions that the agreements were valid and
enforceable. The courts did not say that the provisions of the agreements
constituted permissible limitations, but clearly held that the agreements did
not impose any measurable limitations. 4 It is submitted here, however, that
both agreements inflicted substantial limitations on the discretionary statutory
authority of the respective school boards. While the courts come to what is
probably a desirable result, the rationale employed does not support that
result.
Section 10-22.4 of the Illinois School Code grants school boards the
power to dismiss a teacher for any sufficient cause.4 9 The only limitations on
that power are those imposed by the Illinois Tenure Law.o In regard to the
dismissal of a teacher completing his first year of teaching, the tenure law
requires the board to give written notice of the impending dismissal at least
sixty days prior to the end of the school year." There is no mention of the
need for either a written statement of reasons or a hearing before the board.
There also is no requirement that any particular evaluation procedure be
followed prior to the taking of action. In regard to the dismissal of a teacher
completing a second year of teaching, the board is required to give "written
notice of dismissal stating the specific reason therefore by registered mail...
at least sixty days before the end . . . " of the school year."2 There is again no
mention of any right to a hearing or to have any particular evaluation
procedures followed prior to the dismissal.
The Davis agreement obviously imposed many more limitations on the
school board's power to dismiss teachers than are provided by the tenure
statutes. While Davis was entitled by law only to sixty days notice and a
statement of reasons, the agreement required that he be given a conference
before any action was taken, a complete review of his personnel file, and the
47. 23 Il. App. 3d 649, 659, 320 N.E.2d 240, 247 (1974).
48. Id.; Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 15 Il. App. 3d 224, 228, 304 N.E.2d
516, 519 (1973).
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.4 (1973). This section provides that a board has the
power to "dismiss a teacher for incompetency, immorality or other sufficient cause and to dismiss
any teacher, whenever, in its opinion, he is not qualified to teach, or whenever, in its opinion, the
interests of the schools require it, subject however to the provisions of Section 24-10 to 24-15
inclusive. Marriage is not a cause of removal." See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 34-84 and
34-85 (1973).
50. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 24-11 to 24-15 inclusive (1973). See also Rockford Educ.
Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 11 111. App. 3d 78, 80, 296 N.E.2d 100, 102 (1973).
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-11 (1973).
52. Id.
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right to a hearing." But of particular importance here are the provisions of the
agreement that obligated the school administration to follow a specific
program of teacher evaluation. 4 Violation of those evaluation procedures
constituted the basis of the court's ruling that the dismissal of Davis was
improper. Thus, even though the dismissal provisions of the tenure law do not
require a board to follow any evaluation procedures, the Davis holding would
permit a board to make the fulfillment of contractually-imposed evaluation
requirements a prerequisite to the exercise of its dismissal power."
Upon analysis of the purpose of the tenure law, the limitation effects of
an agreement such as the one in Davis become even more apparent. The
courts have held that "the Teacher Tenure Law appears to be designed
primarily for the protection of tenured teachers, evidencing an intent to give
first year teachers the least amount of protection and the board the maximum
amount of flexibility in dealing with such teachers as long as the notice
requirement is fulfilled." 56 The terms of the Davis agreement certainly
contravened that intent.
Section 24-12 of the school code requires a board of education to follow
detailed procedures before dismissing a tenured teacher.57 But Section 24-1 1
provides that "[c]ontractual continued service status shall not restrict the
power of the board to transfer a teacher to a position which the teacher is
qualified to fill . . . ." Thus none of the restrictions on dismissals apply to
transfers. The agreement in Classroom, however, attempted to impose
requirements of evaluation, notice, explanation, hearing, and just cause on the
exercise by a school board of its power to transfer teachers.5" The result is a
substantial limitation on the board's discretionary authority.
Both the Davis and Classroom courts, in deciding that the collective
bargaining agreements did not constitute substantial limitations on the boards'
powers, relied heavily on the distinction from the arbitration case of Board of
53. The United States Supreme Court has held that refusal to give a non-tenured teacher a
hearing when his contract is not going to be renewed is not a violation of federal due process
rights. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See also Shirck v.
Thomas, 486 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1973).
54. See note 43 supra for the provisions of the Davis agreement.
55. The Davis agreement would place an even greater limitation on the dismissal provisions
of Article 34 of the Illinois School Code. Section 34-84 provides that during a probationary
period of three years a teacher may be dismissed for any reason upon the recommendation
accompanied by written reasons of the superintendent. Section 34-85 says that "jnlo teacher or
principal appointed by the board of education shall (after serving the probationary period of three
"
years specified in Section 34-84) be removed except for cause ....
56. Rockford Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 1 Ill. App. 3d 78, 80, 296 N.E.2d 100, 102
(1973). See also Ruff v. Bd. of School Directors, 335 Ill. App. 445, 82 N.E.2d 203 (1948).
57. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-12 (1973). This section requires the following
procedures to be observed before a tenured teacher can be dismissed: (1) advance notice of any
remediable faults; (2) written notice of charges sixty days prior to proposed date of dismissal;
(3) notice of the right to a bill of particulars; (4) notice of the right to a hearing before the board;
(5) majority vote of all members of the board. See also ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 34-85 (1973).
58. See note 35 supra for the provisions of the Classroom agreement.
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Education v. Rockford Education Association." Such a distinction might have
been legitimate in Classroom, but not in Davis since the holding of Board of
Education v. Johnson,"0 decided four months before Davis by the same
Appellate District, made that distinction meaningless.
In Johnson the court held that certain "minor" disputes are arbitrable.
While the court recognized that matters specifically reserved to the authority
of the board by the school code cannot be subjected to binding arbitration, it
ruled that terms in collective bargaining agreements not in contravention of
the code are arbitrable." The Davis court clearly ruled that the terms of its
agreement were not in contravention of the school code.62 Thus, following the
reasoning in Johnson, they would be arbitrable. The conclusion of Davis that
the agreement was permissible because it did not involve binding arbitration is
illogical.
It is apparent that Davis and Classroom do not provide any firm
guidelines as to what subject matter is within the permissible scope of
collective bargaining contracts. It is possible, however, to develop a rationale
to reach the result found in Classroom and Davis, while also providing
understandable criteria whereby school boards and teachers associations can
readily determine the scope of negotiability of any given item.
A

SUGGESTED APPROACH TO THE LIMITATION PROBLEM

The major fault of the Davis and Classroom approach is that it attempts
to say something is not a limitation when in fact it is. A better approach would
be for the courts to propound a rationale which supports the view that some
limitations on a school board's powers are acceptable while others are not.
Such a rationale can be developed. It consists principally of abandoning the
general rule that a school board cannot limit its powers by contract and the
imposition of a less ambiguous restriction on the power of school boards to
enter into collective bargaining agreements. The following material will
examine this rationale in detail.
The Invalidity of the Nonlimitation Rule
In order to develop the above rationale it is essential to first explore the
origins and evolution of the rule that a school board cannot limit its powers by
contract. Originally the rule stated simply that the powers held by a
legislatively-created body could not be delegated to any other parties. 631 It was
59. 3 111. App. 3d 1090, 280 N.E.2d 286 (1972). See the third section of this article for a
discussion of the Rockford case.
60. 21 111. App. 3d 482, 315 N.E.2d 634 (1974). See the third section of this article for a
discussion of the Johnson case.
61. Id. at 492, 315 N.E.2d at 642.
62. 23 111. App. 3d 649, 659,320 N.E.2d 240. 248 (1974).
63. Chicago v. Trotter, 136 Ill.
430, 26 N.E. 359 (1891); East St. Louis v. Wehrung. 50
Ill.
28 (1869).
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not until the decision in Lindblad v. Board of Education 64 that the rule was
expanded to prohibit any limitation of powers.
Lindblad dealt with a contract executed between a school board and the
Illinois state board of education which set up a system allowing students at a
state university to practice teaching in the board's public schools. The
contract provided that some of the student teachers were to be selected by a
joint action of the public school superintendent and the state university
officials; others were to be selected entirely by the university authorities. The
supervising teachers, who were employed by the public school board, were to
be selected by the concurrent action of the public school board and the state
board of education. The contract was attacked by a taxpayer on the grounds
that it was beyond the power of the board because "the board of education of
Normal school district [had] thereby surrendered or delegated, in whole or in
part, certain discretionary powers vested in it. .. ,"61

The court agreed with the plaintiff. It observed that the Normal school
board was given by legislative enactment the discretionary powers to conduct
and manage the schools, including the power to employ and dismiss
teachers.6 6 The court recited the general rule that such discretionary powers
could not be delegated to another. 7 It enlarged the restriction on delegation,
however, by holding that the fact that the Normal school board could only
employ certain teachers with the approval of the state board was, "if not a
delegation of authority

. . .

at least a limitation which the public school board

[had] no right to place upon its own powers."" Thus the doctrine that a
school board cannot limit its discretionary powers by contract was formalized.
The question raised by the Lindblad expression of a non-limitation rule is
whether such an articulation has stare decisis effect. The Classroom and
Davis courts both accepted the statement as if it did have such effect. But a
strong argument can be made that the Lindblad declaration of non-limitation
was simply dictum. The facts of the case involved a clear delegation of
authority. The school board had given the state board the discretionary
authority to determine the qualifications of teachers for the Normal school
system, an action which clearly involved much more than a simple limitation
of powers. Thus the statement concerning non-limitation was not essential to
holding the contract invalid.
69
A rationale for the Lindblad rule was enunciated in Stroh v. Casner:
"The law contemplates that these discretionary powers shall be exercised by
64. 221 111.261,77 N.E. 450 (1906).
65. Id. at 267, 77 N.E. 450 (1906).
66. The school board here had received such power by virtue of the legislative act
incorporating the town of Normal. Id.
430, 26 N.E. 359 (1891); East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 50
67. Chicago v. Trotter, 136 Ill.
111.
28 (1869).
68. Id. at 272, 77 N.E. at 453 (emphasis added).
App. 281 (1916).
69. 201 Ill.
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those who have been chosen by the people as members of these respective
boards, and the people have a right to have those powers exercised by those
only in whom they have so placed their confidence, and not by such persons
and others jointly. These discretionary powers cannot be delegated."' 0 This
rationale certainly seems to be aimed more at the idea of turning authority
over to third persons than to limiting one's discretion to act. It would suggest
that while a board cannot bind itself to follow the dictates of any other party,
there is nothing to prevent it from dictating to itself.
Arguably there is no sound basis for holding that a board cannot limit its
statutory authority. The courts are free to reject the doctrine and hold that a
school board is not precluded from entering a contract with a teachers
association simply because that contract in some way limits the power of the
board.
The Development of a New Rule
Once the doctrine of non-limitation is discredited, the question arises as
to what restrictions should be placed on the ability of a collective bargaining
agreement to limit the discretionary powers of a school board, since the entire
operation of a school system should not be made to depend on the provisions
of a collective bargaining agreement. Initially a court could hold that the
enforceable terms of a collective bargaining agreement should relate only to
matters within the employment relationship and not to matters of educational
policy." Naturally any matter concerning a school board's statutory authority
to appoint 2 and dismiss 3 teachers directly involves the employment relationship. To further define what falls within the employment relationship, the
court could utilize the reasoning in Board of Education v. Johnson 4 and rule
that any matter not specifically reserved to the board by the school code may
be a proper subject for a collective bargaining agreement. Such a rule would
not only prevent matters of educational policy from being dictated by the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement, but would also make it possible for
negotiators to readily determine whether any given item may legally be
included in an agreement.
The Extent of the Board's Authority and the Resulting Scope of Collective
Bargaining Agreements
The final question concerns the power of the school board itself to deal
with matters of employment. The rule developed here would allow school
70. Id. at 286.
71. See Note, Teacher Negotiations in Illinois: Current Status and Proposed Reforms,
1973 U. ILL. L.F. 307, 320.
Such an approach is similar to the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act which
stipulate that an employer must negotiate with the representative of his employees "in respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. §§
158(a)(5), 159(a) (1970).
72. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 10-20.7, 34-16 (1973).
73. Id. §§ 10-22.4, 34-84, and 34-85.
74. 21 Ill. App. 3d 482, 315 N.E.2d 634 (1974). See discussion of Johnson case in third
section of this article.
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boards to enter into binding collective bargaining agreements dealing with
matters of teacher employment and dismissal. But any negotiation must take
into account the extent of a board's powers, for obviously the statutory
powers of a board cannot be legally expanded by a collective bargaining
agreement. The case of Richards v. Board ofEducation 5 is on point.
In Richards the plaintiff teacher had attacked the adoption by the
defendant school board of a salary schedule in which advancement was
dependant on a teacher's acquisition of additional college hours as well as
longevity. The plaintiff contended that the school board was without statutory
authority to adopt such a salary schedule. The court, in considering that
contention, proceeded to examine the school code. It found the school code
provided ". . . that school boards shall appoint teachers and fix the amount of
their salaries 'subject to the limitation set forth in this Act.' '", After listing
the various limitations spelled out in the code," the court concluded that the
action of the board in adopting a salary schedule based on professional growth
was a proper exercise of the board's power to appoint teachers and fix
salaries. The following excerpt from the opinion summarizes the court's
reasoning: "From the language the legislature has employed, it is clear that a
school board has discretionary control over the salaries of its teachers, subject
only to any limits expressly fixed by the school code and to constitutional
prohibitions against actions that are arbitrary, discriminatory and unreasonable, or based upon an improper classification."' 8
It can be argued that if the board has the authority to fix salaries in any
manner not inconsistent with express statutory provisions, then it should be
able to determine other conditions of employment in the same manner. The
key to the argument lies in the language of the statute. It states that the board
shall have the power to "appoint all teachers and fix their salaries subject to
the limitations set forth in this Act."' 9 The power of appointment would
logically include the power to determine conditions of appointment other than
salary. The same reasoning would apply to the power of the board to dismiss
teachers since Section 10-22.4 of the school code states that a board has the
power to dismiss for sufficient cause subject only to the restrictions of the
75. 21111. 2d 104, 171 N.E.2d 37 (1960).
76. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-1 (1973). Section 34-16 differs somewhat in that it
provides that "[tlhe board shall, subject to the limitations in this Article, prescribe . . .the
duties, compensation and terms of employment of its employees .... "
77. Express restrictions on school board powers regarding the determination of salaries are
set out in the Illinois School Code in Sections 24-2 (teachers must be paid for legal school
holidays), 24-3 (teachers must be paid for attendance at teachers' institutes held under the
direction of the county superintendent), 24-6 (at least ten days paid sick leave must be granted to
full time employees each year), 24-6.1 (sabbaticals must not be granted for a period of more than
one year or more often than once every six years), 24-7 (no discrimination in salary shall be
made on the basis of sex), and 24-8 (teachers must be paid certain minimum salaries). Article 34
does not specify the restrictions of Article 24, thus one would assume that those boards would
have greater latitude in the determination of salaries.
78. 21 111. 2d 104, 109, 171 N.E.2d 37, 41 (1960) (emphasis added).
79. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-1 (1973).
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tenure law.8 0 Since a school board, under the raionale developed here, may
limit its powers, the permissible scope of a collective bargaining agreement
would extend to all conditions of employment restricted only by the type of
guidelines set out in Richards."
CONCLUSION

The need for clearly-defined guidelines establishing the permissible scope
of collective bargaining agreements is evident. The most desirable way to
arrive at such guidelines is by legislation. But until the General Assembly
acts, the courts must provide the criteria necessary for school boards to
determine what provisions they may legally incorporate into a collective
bargaining agreement.
The courts have provided concrete guidelines for determining whether a
collective bargaining agreement can provide for arbitration in a given area. As
long as the arbitration provision does not delegate any powers specifically
reserved to the board by the school code, or contravene any other express
provision of the code, it is permissible. Such a rule allows for arbitration of
most matters relating to the duties of teachers.
Unfortunately, the cases do not offer any workable guidelines for
ascertaining to what extent a collective bargaining agreement may limit the
discretionary powers of a school board when arbitration is not involved. The
Classroom and Davis cases indicated that limitations going to matters of
fundamental fairness may be included in such agreements. The rationale they
offered, however, does not support the holdings. Therefore, the Classroom
and Davis decisions offer no guidance as to the permissible scope of collective
bargaining agreements.
This article's position is that it is possible to develop a rationale that will
support the holding in Davis and Classroom and also provide reasonably firm
guidelines for resolving questions of the permissible scope of collective
bargaining agreements generally. The key to that rationale is the fact that
there is no solid basis in precedent for the rule that a school board may not
80. Id. §§ 24-11 through 24-15.
81. The school code sets out express restrictions on the board's power to appoint teachers
and determine employment conditions in Sections 24-4 (color, race, nationality or religion cannot
be considered as a qualification or disqualification), 24-5 (evidence of physical fitness must be
shown by teacher as a condition of employment), 24-9 (teachers must receive a duty-free lunch
period of at least thirty minutes), and 34-84 (appointments and promotions shall be made for
merit only).
Some of the restrictions on the board's power to dismiss are set out in Sections 10-22.4
(teachers may be removed only, for cause), 24-1 I (after two years of probationary service a
teacher must be placed on tenure or a third year probation, and after a third probationary year
must either be placed on tenure or dismissed; a teacher may be dismissed only after proper
notice), 24-12 (a tenured teacher must be given a hearing if he requests it), and, for districts with
over 500,000 population, 34-85 (tenured teachers may be dismissed only for cause, with proper
notice, and after a hearing).
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legally limit its discretionary powers. The courts are perfectly free to reject
the non-limitation doctrine. Once such a rejection is made, the task remaining
for the courts' determination is what restrictions should, as a matter of public
policy, be placed on a school board's authority to limit its discretionary
powers through a collective bargaining agreement. The suggestion here is that
the scope of collective bargaining agreements should be restricted to matters
involving the employment relationship. Thus the rule would be that a
collective bargaining agreement can include provisions for conditions of
employment and dismissal, subject, of course, to constitutional and express
statutory restrictions.
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